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This paper examined the content and determinants of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
disclosure practices. This study found that the number of firms disclosed is increased
from 42.9% in 2011 to 48.1% in 2014. The assessment of risks and opportunities of
climate change theme is the most disclosed item. Miscellaneous industries disclosed
more GHG emission information compared with any other industry. The results also
show that profitability, leverage, company size, and industry are significant determi-
nants that can explain the extent of GHG emission disclosure. The findings of this
study indicated that GHG emission disclosures are used as a mechanism to reduce
pressures from stakeholders. This study contributes to the GHG emission disclosure
literature by providing patterns and determinants of companies' GHG emission disclo-
sure in an emerging country.
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Currently, companies worldwide have gradually started considering the
substantial risk of climate change, both the direct physical impact on
their businesses and climate change policies that change consumption
patterns (Luo, Tang, & Lan, 2013). Several countries such as the
European Union, the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and
New Zealand have committed to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions (including carbon emissions) by issuing mandatory regulations for
companies to disclose information related to GHG emissions (World
Resources Institute, 2015). The Australian government introduced a
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act as a framework for
reporting GHG emissions (Choi, Lee, & Psaros, 2013). Under the
Companies Act 2006 (Strategic and Directors' Reports) Regulations
2013, the U.K. government requires companies to report their annual
GHG emissions in their directors' report. In contrast to Indonesia, there
has never been a specific regulation that mandates to disclose
GHG information. The Government Regulation Number 47 (2012) only
requires companies running their business activities in the field and/or
related to the natural resources to implement social and environmentalwileyonlinelibrary.com/journaresponsibility (Article 74, paragraph 1). Also, the Law Number 17/2004
and Presidential Decree Number 61/2011 only determine regulation
regarding a national action plan for reducing the six GHGs as targeted
by the Kyoto Protocol, namely, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
nitrous oxide (N2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons, and
hydrofluorocarbons. Although there have been some mandatory regu-
lations related to reporting GHG emissions in some developed coun-
tries, nonetheless, disclosure practices are still incomplete (Liesen,
Hoepner, Patten, & Figge, 2015), and their comprehensibility is still
questionable (Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008), especially in Indonesia,
where the GHG reporting is still unregulated and voluntary.
Most previous studies of GHG emission disclosure have been
conducted in developed and Western countries, such as Australia
(see Andrew & Cortese, 2011; Choi et al., 2013; Hrasky, 2012; Li,
Eddie, & Liu, 2014; Rankin, Windsor, & Wahyuni, 2011; Wang, Li, &
Gao, 2014), the United Kingdom (Baboukardos, 2017; Chithambo &
Tauringana, 2014; de Aguiar & Bebbington, 2014), the United States
(see Kim & Lyon, 2011; Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2014; Stanny, 2013;
Stanny & Ely, 2008), and Canada (see Ben‐Amar & McIlkenny, 2014).
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1398 FAISAL ET AL.companies during the period 2006–2008 when the Australian govern-
ment announced a series of regulations regarding GHG emission dis-
closure; they found that the level of disclosure was 46.0%. Using
210 firms listed on the U.K. Financial Times Stock Exchange,
Chithambo and Tauringana (2014) showed that the extent of GHG
emission disclosure was 38.5%.
In developing and Asian countries, most studies of GHG emission
disclosure were conducted in China (see He, Tang, & Wang, 2013; Li,
Yang, & Tang, 2015). Chu, Chatterjee, and Brown (2012) found that
61% of theTop 100 A‐share issuing companies on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange disclosed GHG emission information with the mean of dis-
closure that is 24.9%. Peng, Sun, and Luo (2015) examined 1,744 of
China's nonfinancial A‐share listed companies listed on both the
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2012. They
found that the proportion of firms reporting carbon‐related informa-
tion in their corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports increased
from 19.9% in 2008 to 26.5% in 2012. However, the extent of GHG
disclosure is only 5%. On the basis of these studies, it may indicate
that the extent of GHG disclosure in developed countries is higher
than in developing countries.
Some previous studies have also investigated determinants of
GHG emission disclosure. Borghei‐Ghomi and Leung (2013) found a
significant relationship between company characteristics, corporate
governance, and GHG emission disclosure in Australia. Using U.K.
companies, Chithambo and Tauringana (2014) examined factors that
affect the disclosure of GHG emissions; their results showed that cor-
porate governance characteristics affected GHG emission disclosure.
In Asia, He et al. (2013) suggested that carbon performance and cost
of capital have a significant influence on GHG emission disclosure
for companies listed on Standard & Poor's 500 that participated in
the Carbon Disclosure Project. Although previous studies have inves-
tigated factors influencing GHG emissions, few studies have detailed
content of GHG emission disclosure and focused on internal contex-
tual factors such as firm size, profitability, leverage, industry, and own-
ership in developing countries (Ali, Frynas, & Mahmood, 2017),
especially in Indonesia. This study is the first to explore the content
and determinants of GHG emission disclosures in Indonesia. Indonesia
presents an interesting case in which to explore the pattern and deter-
minants of GHG emission disclosures. Indonesian companies, for some
time now, have been facing a number of factors exposing them to CSR
practices. These include the issues of poverty alleviation, health and
safety of the environment, pollution, deforestation, social and political
insecurity, and the high needs for direct foreign investment
(Djajadikerta & Trireksani, 2012, p. 22). In spite of these problems,
since 2013, the Indonesian government has continuously released
GHG regulations as a commitment to reducing GHG emissions and
improved sustainable development and a contribution towards over-
coming global warming. The findings of the study offer both theoreti-
cal and practical insights into the extent and pattern of GHG emission
disclosures and what factors determine disclosure. The research ques-
tions addressed in this study are (a) what is the extent and pattern of
GHG emission disclosure and (b) whether firm's factors influence the
extent of GHG emission disclosure.
The remaining parts of the paper proceed as follows: The next
section reviews the theoretical framework. Section 3 explains theGHG emission regulation in Indonesia. Section 4 presents the hypoth-
esis development. Research method is provided in Section 5. Section 6
presents the discussion and the results of the analysis. Finally,
Section 7 presents the conclusion and limitations of the research.2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines stakeholders as groups or individual in
company that can influence or be influenced by the activity of the
company. One of the principles of stakeholder theory is that everyone
should take responsibility for the impact of their respective deeds
towards others (Gray, 2001). A company's existence is affected by
stakeholders' support; the viability of an enterprise relies on the sup-
port of its stakeholders. The more powerful the stakeholders, the
greater a company's effort to adapt to the corporate environment
(Parmar et al., 2010). Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995) argued that the
stakeholder theory can be tested through content analysis of a
company's annual reports; this is the most efficient way for organisa-
tions to communicate with stakeholders. Therefore, GHG disclosure
is considered a part of the dialogue between companies and
stakeholders.
Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations continually seek to
ensure that they are perceived as operating within the bounds and
norms of their respective societies (Suchman, 1995, p. 573). According
to Deegan (2002), legitimacy and status are conditions that occur
when a company's value system is congruent with the value system
of the larger social system in which the company operates. The legiti-
macy of the company is threatened when there is a real or potential
difference between these two value systems. A theoretical construct
known as the “social contract” is central to legitimacy, which relies
on the notion that the legitimacy of a business entity to operate in
society depends on an implicit social contract between a business
entity and society (Lindblom, 1994, p. 2). Therefore, an organisation's
survival might be threatened if society perceives that the organisation
has breached its social contract (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). Qian and
Schaltegger (2017) argue that companies are regarded as adaptive
entities reacting to social and environmental pressures, such as GHG
emissions. GHG disclosures thus may be used as a powerful medium
to influence the perceptions of stakeholders and thereby contribute
towards the maximisation of earning potential (Gray, Javad, Power,
& Sinclair, 2001, p. 329).
Institutional theory is a branch of legitimacy theory that describes
the institutional pressures faced by organisations. As a result of these
pressures, organisations tend to be similar in shape and practices
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Islam & Deegan, 2008). According to
Cahaya, Porter, Tower, and Brown (2012, p. 115), institutional theory
has two dimensions: isomorphism and decoupling. In the context of
this study, isomorphism relates to the ways in which institutional set-
ting affects GHG disclosures. Deegan (2009) suggests that decoupling
occurs when the practice of GHG disclosure creates a different image
of environmental responsibility activities, programmes, and policies
among stakeholders. Moreover, Deegan (2009) states that isomor-
phism comprises three processes: coercive, mimetic, and normative.
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism
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sures, arise from stakeholder pressure. Mimetic isomorphism refers to
situations where an organisation mimics the practices of other institu-
tional organisations, which often happens for competitive advantage.
Finally, normative isomorphism refers to pressures arising from the
norms of groups, for example, a manager is pressured to implement
a certain institutional practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).3 | INDONESIAN REGULATION OF GHG
EMISSIONS
In Indonesia, regulation related to social and environmental issues
started in 2007 when the government released the Company Law
Number 40/2007 and the National Action Plan on Climate Change
(NAPACC) programme. The Company Law Number 40/2007 stipu-
lated that companies running their business activities in the field
and/or related to natural resources implement social and environmen-
tal responsibility (Article 74, paragraph 1). Any company that does not
perform this obligation will be sanctioned in accordance with the pro-
visions of the legislation (Article 74, paragraph 3). In 2008, the
National Council on Climate Change was formed as a forum to com-
municate climate change issues to stakeholders. Complementing this
commitment, the Presidential Regulation Numbers 11/2011 and 71/
2011 were released. According to this regulation (Number 11/2011),
the national action plan consists of three actions for emissions reduc-
tion targets and industry sector targets: strategies, programmes, and
activities contributing to emission reduction and authorities responsi-
ble for programmes and activities. Meanwhile, the implementation of a
GHG inventory aimed to provide information periodically about the
level, status, and trends of changes in emissions and GHG absorption,
including carbon deposits at the national level, provinces, and
counties. However, such these regulations only set policies regarding
the commitment to reduce the GHG emissions, not for reporting.
There is no a specific government regulation that govern the GHG
emission reporting.4 | RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
4.1 | Profitability
Profitability is a company's ability to earn income or profit within a
specific period using all capital owned (Pahuja, 2009). Companies with
high profitability will be considered good prospects for the future,
because high levels of profitability demonstrate a company's efficiency
and the survival of a company. Many previous studies from
multitheoretical perspectives have suggested that profitability is posi-
tively related to the extent of environmental disclosure (Adams &
Hardwick, 1998; Ben‐Amar & McIlkenny, 2014; Calza, Profumo, &
Tutore, 2014; Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005; Liesen
et al., 2015; Tagesson, Blank, Broberg, & Collin, 2009). Liu and
Anbumozhi (2009) suggest that companies in a good financial position
tend to disclose more environmental information. Stanny and Ely
(2008) argue that firms that are more profitable would be likely to
want to disclose GHG emissions more to convey positive outlook toinvestors. Moreover, the better the financial performance of a com-
pany, the greater a company's financial ability to include carbon emis-
sion reduction strategies into their business strategies (Cormier &
Magnan, 1999). Firms that are more profitable have more resources
to engage in GHG emission reduction and disclosure. Good companies
in their financial performance will be able to avoid losses due to their
involvement in the GHG emission activities, and at the same time, it
can give a positive signal to stakeholders. On the basis of this evi-
dence, the following hypothesis is proposed:H1 Firms with higher levels of profitability will disclose
more GHG emission information than firms with lower
levels of profitability.4.2 | Leverage
Leverage is a ratio intended to measure how a company's assets are
financed by both long‐term and short‐term debts (Pahuja, 2009). Pre-
vious studies have reported that the relationship between leverage
and environmental disclosure is negative (Adams & Hardwick, 1998;
Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Brammer & Millington, 2004; Giannarakis,
2014; Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009). Andrikopoulos and Kriklani (2013)
found that companies with higher leverage tend to decrease the
GHG emission disclosure as preparation to provide disclosure is costly.
Consistent with Andrikopoulos and Kriklani (2013), Luo et al. (2013)
argue that firms with high leverage and interest payments will be more
cautious in revealing expenses related to GHG emission precautions
and, therefore, will limit their ability to execute strategic GHG emis-
sion reduction and disclosure. Chithambo and Tauringana (2014) sug-
gest that companies that have lower debt tend to disclose GHG
emission information because of motivation to send a signal to the
market and to attract investors to invest in socially responsible compa-
nies. Firms that are higher leverage associated with an increase in the
risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, managers may act to reduce the discre-
tionary costs that are not related to main business activities such as
GHG emission disclosure. By reducing the discretionary expenditures,
company can avoid the risk of bankruptcy; thus, it can reduce pres-
sures from stakeholders. The following hypothesis is proposed:H2 Firms with higher levels of leverage will disclose less
GHG emission information than firms with lower levels
of leverage.4.3 | Firm size
According to stakeholder and legitimacy theories, larger companies are
under more public attention (Brammer & Millington, 2004; Dowling &
Pfeffer, 1975). The larger the size of a company, the greater the num-
ber of stakeholders involved in the activities of the company, and they
also have higher expectations regarding GHG emission practices
(Cormier et al., 2005; Cormier & Gordon, 2001; Hackston & Milne,
1996). As a result, pressure from stakeholders is also higher (Brammer
& Pavelin, 2004; Cho & Patten, 2007). Under such conditions, meeting
stakeholders' demands is mandatory (Patten, 2002). GHG emission
disclosure is a mechanism that can be performed by a company to
reduce this pressure (Rankin et al., 2011). Therefore, large companies
1400 FAISAL ET AL.will be more responsive to this demand of GHG emission disclosure in
order to avoid conflict (Cormier et al., 2005; Kuo & Chen, 2013).
Results of previous studies show a positive relationship between firm
size and voluntary environmental disclosure (Ben‐Amar & McIlkenny,
2014; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Kim & Lyon, 2011; Kuzey & Uyar,
2017; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; Stanny & Ely, 2008). It is
assumed that large companies have enough resources to meet the
costs related to GHG emission disclosure. Assumptions have
underlined that larger companies will disclose more information than
smaller firms (Chithambo & Tauringana, 2014). The following hypoth-
esis is proposed:H3 Larger firms will disclose more GHG emission
information than smaller sized firms.TABLE 1 Sample selection
Criteria
Year (2011–2014)
2011 2012 2013 2014 Total4.4 | Industry type
Dye and Sridhar (1995) state that companies are more likely to
disclose information in accordance with the characteristics of their
industry. Previous studies suggested that companies belonging to
high‐profile industries tend to have a greater risk because they receive
more attention from the wider community (consumer visibility), they
engage in higher levels of competition (Roberts, 1992), and companies'
activities tend to have a negative influence on the environment
(Reverte, 2009). Alternatively, low‐profile industries have lower con-
sumer visibility, so companies' risks tend to be lower (Roberts, 1992).
Some industries that generate high emission levels may face greater
pressure from stakeholders and regulators compared with other indus-
tries. For example, a study conducted by Rankin et al. (2011) showed
that companies belonging to the mining and energy industry provide
more credible and consistent GHG emission information.Number of firms listed on
Indonesia Stock Exchange
442 463 486 509 1,900
Number of financial firms 81 81 81 81 324H4 Firms in sensitive industries will disclose more GHG
emission information than firms within nonsensitive
industries.
Firm consistently provides GHG
information in annual reports
since 2011
37 37 37 37 148
Percentage sample to total listed
firm
10.24 9.68 9.13 8.64 9.39
Note. GHG: greenhouse gas.




1 Agriculture 20 13.5
2 Mining 36 24.3
3 Basic industry and chemicals 44 29.7
4 Miscellaneous industries 4 2.70
5 Consumer goods industries 12 8.10






8 Trade, services, and
investment
12 8.05
Total 148 1004.5 | Government ownership
Ownership structure is considered as a factor that affects disclosure of
GHG emissions, as it represents the status of a company's capital.
Previous studies suggest that companies that are majority owned by
government are expected to be more concerned with social and envi-
ronmental issues, such as GHG emission reduction (Amran & Devi,
2008; Haji, 2013; Tagesson et al., 2009). Calza et al. (2014) argue that
pressures from government can influence managers on environmental
issues. Their finding shows that there is a positive relationship
between state ownership and environmental performance for
European companies. The Indonesian government has released several
laws and regulations related to environmental disclosure, such as Law
Number 40/2007, for limited liability companies, Law Number
32/2009 for the protection and management of the environment,
and the Minister of Environment Number/2011 regulation for a
corporate performance‐rating programme for environmental manage-
ment. As the owner of a company, the government will be more
concern with how the legislation released can directly affect a com-
pany (Habbash, 2016). Reid and Toffel (2009) argue that governmentmay act as change agents in setting a new legislation regarding GHG
disclosure. Therefore, the propensity of managers to reduce pressure
from government may be mitigated by communicating GHG emissions
via disclosures.H5 State‐owned enterprises (SoEs) will disclose more
GHG emission information than other firms.5 | METHODS
5.1 | Sample and data collection
GHG emission data were sourced from publicly listed companies'
2011 to 2014 annual reports, and financial and accounting data were
collected from the Bloomberg database. A baseline year of 2011 was
selected because Government Regulation Number 61/2011 was
released in this year. In 2011, 37 firms that disclosed GHG information
met the criteria for sampling. Table 1 presents the sample selection.
Table 2 lists the study samples based on nine industry sectors
according to the Indonesia Stock Exchange classifications: (a) agricul-
ture, including plantations, animal husbandry, fisheries, and forestry;
(b) mining, including coal mining, crude petroleum and natural gas pro-
duction, metal and mineral mining, and land/stone quarrying; (c) basic
industry and chemicals, including cement, ceramics, glass, porcelain,
metal and allied products, chemicals, plastics and packaging, animal
feed, wood industries, and pulp and paper; (d) miscellaneous
TABLE 3 GHG emission disclosure checklist
GHG emission
category Coding GHG emission details
CC CC1 1. Assessment of risks and opportunities
CC2 2. Financial implications
GH GH1 3. Methodology for calculation
GH2 4. External verification
GH3 5. Total emissions
GH4 6. Disclosure by scope
GH5 7. Disclosure by source
GH6 8. Disclosure by facility or segment
GH7 9. Historical comparison of emissions
EC EC1 10. Total consumed
EC2 11. Disclosure consumption from
renewable source
EC3 12. Disclosure by type, facility, or
segment
RC RC1 13. Plans to reduce GHG emissions
RC2 14. Targets for GHG emissions
RC3 15. Reductions achieved to date
RC4 16. Costs of future emissions factored in
capital expenditure planning
AC AC1 17. Explanation of where responsibility l
ies for climate change policy and action
AC2 18. Mechanism by which board reviews
company progress on climate change
actions
Note. 1 = if item disclosed; 0 = otherwise; GHG disclosure index
(GHGDisc) = number of items disclosed by firm divided by total items
(18 items). GHG: greenhouse gas; CC: climate change: risks and opportuni-
ties greenhouse gas emissions; GH: greenhouse gas emissions; EC: energy
consumption; RC: greenhouse gas reduction and cost; AC: greenhouse gas
emission accountability. Source. Choi et al. (2013).
FAISAL ET AL. 1401industries, including machinery and heavy equipment, automotive and
components, textile and garments, footwear, and cables; (e) consumer
goods industries, including food and beverages, tobacco manufac-
turers, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, and houseware; (f) property, real
estate, and building constructions; (g) infrastructure, utilities, and
transportation, including energy, toll roads, and airports; (h) financial;
and (i) trade, services, and investment, including wholesale, retail trade,
restaurants, hotels, and tourism. For this study, the financial sector
was excluded. The financial sector was excluded as this study has an
independent variable, namely, leverage. The high leverage in nonfinan-
cial sector may indicate that the company has financial distress prob-
lems. However, in financial sector, high leverage is common, and it
does not indicate a problem. Therefore, the conclusion of the finding
of this study may be bias regarding the negative relationship between
leverage and the extent of GHG emission disclosure if the financial
sector was included as the sample.
As shown in Table 2, basic industry and chemicals represent the
largest sample with 44 firms (29.7%). This is followed by the mining
industry, 36 firms (24.3%), and the smallest group is miscellaneous
industries, four companies (2.7%).
5.2 | Variable measurement and analysis
Consistent with previous studies of GHG emission disclosure, a con-
tent analysis method was used to extract the GHG emission informa-
tion from the annual reports. Measurements of GHG emission
disclosure refers to items developed by Choi et al. (2013) and used
by (Kalu, Buang, & Aliagha, 2016). The use of a checklist item is based
on the consideration that those items represent the Carbon Disclosure
Project questionnaires and are appropriate for GHG emission regula-
tions in Indonesia. The dependent variable is measured using the
unweighting disclosure index approach. In an unweighted index, each
disclosure item is deemed equally important, and therefore, each item
is awarded the same score when it is disclosed; this technique is con-
sidered far less subjective than a weighted index and is more relevant
to all companies (Cooke, 1989, 1993). The score was 1 if the company
disclosed information as determined by the checklist items, and 0 was
assigned if it was not disclosed. Table 3 provides the disclosure check-
list items.
This study employed multivariate regression analysis, which is
used to examine the influence of independent variables on a depen-
dent variable. This analysis also measures the strength of a relation-
ship between these variables, and it shows the direction of the
relationship. The regression equation is
GHGDisc ¼ β0 þ β1PROFþ β2LEVþ β3SIZEþ β4INDUSTRY
þβ5GOVOWNþ ε;
where profitability (PROF) is measured as the ratio of earnings after
tax divided by the total assets; leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio
of total debt divided by the total assets; firm size (SIZE) is measured by
a logarithm of the total assets; and industry membership (INDUSTRY)
is measured by a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the firm is
categorised as a sensitive industry and 0 otherwise. Following the pre-
vious studies, in this study, agriculture, mining, basic industry, andchemicals were categorised as sensitive industries (Moroney, Windsor,
& Aw, 2012) because their activities modify the environment
(resources), and they are more closely monitored for environmental
performance, whereas miscellaneous industries, consumer goods,
property, real estate, and building constructions, infrastructure, utili-
ties, transportation, trade, services, and investment were included as
nonsensitive industries, and government ownership (GOVOWN) was
measured by a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the firm is
an SoE and 0 for other firms.6 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
6.1 | Extent of GHG emission disclosure
Table 4 presents the percentage firm disclosed GHG emission items.
Financial implications are the most disclosed items (86.5%, 94.6%,
97.2%, and 91.9%), followed by assessment of risks and opportunities
(89.1%, 94.6%, 89.1%, and 86.5%), and the least disclosed item is the
cost of future emissions factored into capital expenditure planning
(0%). Choi et al. (2013) results are different; they found that the risk
and opportunity of GHG emission item was the most disclosed. This
finding may indicate different motivations for disclosing GHG emis-
sions between companies in developed countries, such as Australia,
and in an emerging country: Indonesia.
In terms of the percentage of items disclosed per theme by indus-
try (Table 5), companies from the miscellaneous industries (75.0%)
lead in disclose of GHG emissions, followed by mining industry
TABLE 4 Percentage firm disclosed each item
Coding GHG checklist items
Percentage firm disclosed
2011 2012 2013 2014
CC Climate change: risks and opportunities of GHG emissions — — — —
CC1 Assessment of risks and opportunities 89.1 94.6 89.1 86.5
CC2 Financial implications 86.5 94.6 97.2 91.9
GH GHG emissions — — — —
GH1 Methodology for calculation 16.2 18.9 18.9 24.3
GH2 External verification 45.9 54.0 54.0 54.0
GH3 Total emissions 32.4 35.1 37.8 37.8
GH4 Disclosure by scope 43.2 51.3 48.6 51.3
GH5 Disclosure by source 43.2 51.3 48.6 48.6
GH6 Disclosure by facility or segment 13.5 16.2 16.2 16.2
GH7 Historical comparison of emissions 24.3 32.4 32.4 35.1
EC Energy consumption — — — —
EC1 Total consumed 43.2 51.3 51.3 48.6
EC2 Disclosure consumption from renewable source 16.2 21.6 21.6 27.0
EC3 Disclosure by type, facility, or segment 37.8 51.3 51.3 48.6
RC GHG reduction and cost — — — —
RC1 Plans to reduce GHG emissions 67.6 75.7 67.6 67.6
RC2 Targets for GHG emissions 32.4 37.8 35.1 37.8
RC3 Reductions achieved to date 43.2 43.2 43.2 40.5
RC4 Costs of future emissions factored in capital expenditure planning 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AC GHG emission accountability — — — —
AC1 Explanation of where responsibility lies for climate change policy and action 81.0 86.5 91.9 89.9
AC2 Mechanism by which board reviews company progress on climate change actions 56.8 64.9 59.5 59.5
Mean 42.9 48.9 48.0 48.1
Note. GHG: greenhouse gas; CC: climate change: risks and opportunities greenhouse gas emissions; GH: greenhouse gas emissions; EC: energy consump-
tion; RC: greenhouse gas reduction and cost; AC: greenhouse gas emission accountability.
TABLE 5 Number of items disclosed per theme by industry
Industry classification
Percentage item disclosed per theme
CC GH EC RC AC Mean
Agriculture 60.0 12.1 18.3 25.0 77.5 28.6
Mining 97.2 57.5 73.1 56.9 91.7 68.2
Basic industry and chemicals 94.3 25.0 31.1 31.3 68.2 39.9
Miscellaneous industries 100.0 64.3 66.7 75.0 100.0 75.0
Consumer goods industries 83.3 23.8 19.4 39.6 54.2 36.6
Property, real estate, and building constructions 50.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.0 11.1
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 100.0 51.2 44.4 45.8 83.3 57.9
Trade, services, and investment 100.0 31.0 22.2 33.3 54.2 40.3
Mean of total sample 85.6 33.1 34.4 38.4 72.4 52.8
Note. CC: climate change: risks and opportunities greenhouse gas emissions (2 items); GH: greenhouse gas emissions (7 items); EC: energy consumption
(3 items); RC: greenhouse gas reduction and cost (4 items); AC: greenhouse gas emission accountability (2 items). Total items = 18; N = 148.
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vices, and investment (40.3%), basic industry and chemicals (39.9%),
consumer goods industries (36.6%), agriculture (28.6%), and property,
real estate, and building constructions (11.1%). This finding is surpris-
ing. As explained above, that government regulation has released the
limited liability Company Law Number 40/2007 and Government
Regulation Number 47/2012. These regulations mandated that anycompany that operates in a natural resource area will be obligated to
report related corporate social environmental responsibility; this obli-
gation was effective from April 2012. However, the finding of this
study suggested that companies from nonsensitive industry (such as
miscellaneous industries, infrastructure, utilities and transportation,
trade, services, and investment) lead in providing GHG emission
information.
TABLE 6 Descriptive statistics
Continuous variables
Variables N Minimum Maximum M SD
GHG disclosure 148 0.06 1.00 0.52 0.29
Profitability 148 −0.19 0.54 0.12 0.12
Leverage 148 0.01 3.20 0.88 0.71




1 = sensitive industry 96 64.86
0 = other industry 52 35.14
Government ownership 148 100.00
1 = SoEs 28 18.91
0 = other 120 81.09
Note. GHG: greenhouse gas; SOEs: state‐owned enterprises.
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Table 6; they indicate that the mean of GHG emission disclosure is
50.0%, with a minimum of 6.0% and a maximum of 100%. The results
show that there is a large gap in the mean of disclosures, which indi-
cates that GHG emission disclosure exhibits extreme values and is
heavily skewed. Overall, the mean disclosure is relatively high. The
mean profitability suggests that the companies have relatively low
financial performance: The minimum value is −19.0%, and the overall
mean is 12.0%. The low profitability ratio may be a reflection of
Indonesian economic financial hardship during the global financial cri-
sis. The leverage ratio of the sampled firms is 88.0% indicating that
sampled firms' leverages are relatively high; this may indicate thatTABLE 7 Pearson's correlations
Variables 1 2
GHG disclosure 1 0.254**
Profitability 0.254** 1
Leverage −0.226** −0.358**
Firm size 0.475** 0.059
Industry 0.215** −0.078
Government ownership 0.237** 0.155
Note. GHG: greenhouse gas.
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed). *Correlation is significa








Constant −2.049 −5.261 0
Profitability + 0.415 2.407 0
Leverage − −0.074 −2.418 0
Firm size + 0.107 6.346 0
Industry + 0.122 2.834 0
Gov.Own + 0.013 0.239 0
Note. R2 = 0.345; adjusted R2 = 0.322; F = 14.956; p value = 0.000; N = 148. D
ment ownership; VIF: variance inflation factor.creditors represent key stakeholders. For the categorical variables of
industry type, 96 (64.9%) of the total 148 sampled companies were
categorised as sensitive industries and 52 (35.1%) as nonsensitive
industries. The results indicate that sensitive industries tend to pro-
vide more GHG emission disclosure than nonsensitive industries.
Table 6 also shows that 28 (18.9%) of the sampled companies are
owned by the Indonesian government and 120 (81.9%) are non‐SoEs.
Table 7 shows the correlations between the variables; the direc-
tional correlations between dependent and independent variables
are all below the critical limit of 0.80, and it is suggested that there
is no multicollinearity problem between predictor variables.
A heteroscedasticity test suggests that a regression model does
not contain heteroscedasticity if there is no significant relationship
between the absolute value of residuals and independent variables.
In this study, the level of significance for all independent variables
was greater than 0.05. The result of the multicollinearity tests, consis-
tent with Table 7, is shown in Table 8; the tolerance values for all var-
iables are greater than 0.10, and all the VIF values are below 10. It was
concluded that there was no multicollinearity problem in the regres-
sion model.6.2 | Determinants of GHG emissions
Table 8 details the results of the multiple regression. Overall, the mul-
tiple regression shows that the model fits and is statistically signifi-
cant: F statistic = 14.956 and p value = 0.000. The regression has
an adjusted R2 of 32.2%. The details of the hypotheses testing results
are as follows: First, profitability is positively associated with GHG
emission disclosure with a coefficient (p value) of 0.415 (0.017). Thus,
H1 is supported. This finding suggests that a company's economic3 4 5 6
−0.226** 0.475** 0.215** 0.237**
−0.358** 0.059 −0.078 0.155
1 0.021 0.052 −0.192*
0.021 1 0.079 0.259**
0.052 0.079 1 0.211*
−0.192* 0.259** 0.211* 1
nt at the 0.05 level (two tailed).
alue
Multicollinearity Heteroscedasticity
Tolerance VIF t p value
.000 — — 0.832 0.407
.017 0.939 1.065 −2.033 0.454
.017 0.855 1.170 0.470 0.639
.000 0.843 1.186 1.763 0.639
.005 0.925 1.081 0.261 0.080
.812 0.846 1.183 1.474 0.143
ependent variable: greenhouse gas emission disclosure; Gov.Own: govern-
1404 FAISAL ET AL.performance is the most important factor when they are making deci-
sions to engage in environmental responsibility, such as GHG reduc-
tion activities. Given the high numbers for environmental
expenditure, companies that have low economic performance cer-
tainly will give top priority to improving their economic performance
compared with environmental responsibility activities. The result
implies that companies with greater profitability might have an incen-
tive to reveal their good news to stakeholders; they are not only pur-
suing high profit but also showing they are responsible and compliant
with regulations. By producing a higher volume of GHG emission
information, companies can make themselves more attractive to vari-
ous stakeholders, receive less pressure and complaints from communi-
ties, and may enhance the relationship with their stakeholders.
Second, the relationship between leverage and GHG emission
disclosure is negative and significant (coefficient = −0.074;
p value = 0.017). Hence, H2 is supported. This result suggests that
companies with low leverage tend to reveal more GHG emission infor-
mation. This is likely motivated by trying to improve the credibility of
the company with investors, debtholders, and customers. By providing
more relevant information, such as environmental expenditure
incurred for GHG reduction activities, it will reduce pressure from
stakeholders. In contrast, companies with high leverage tend to reduce
GHG emission information. This is because if a company with high
environmental liabilities disclosed more GHG emission information, it
would reduce its cash flow that would in turn impact on its ability to
pay debt (Cormier & Magnan, 1999).
Third, H3 predicted that there is a positive relationship between
firm size and GHG emission disclosure (coefficient = 0.107;
p value = 0.000), and thus, H3 is also supported. Companies that
have high visibility have incentives and greater resources to reduce
the risks of environmental damage arising from their activities.
Companies that are large also have large capacities to shape the pos-
itive perceptions of the public and key stakeholders; their initiative to
disclose GHG emission information is a form of environmental corpo-
rate responsibility. By doing so, a company can maintain their
legitimacy.
Fourth, Table 8 indicates that there is a positive and statistically
significant association between industry type and GHG emission dis-
closure (coefficient = 0.122; p value = 0.005). Hence, H4 is supported.
This finding is in line with prior studies that reported that industry
type, specifically sensitive industries, are more likely to generate
GHG emission disclosure. This finding suggests that a key reason that
sensitive industries make more GHG emission disclosures is to
improve their accountability and visibility. Sensitive industries have a
greater effect on their community, and therefore, they normally have
a broader group of stakeholders to satisfy.
Fifth, there is a positive relationship between government owner-
ship and GHG emission disclosure; however, the relationship is not
statistically significant (coefficient = 0.013; p value = 0.239). Thus,
H5 is not supported. In Indonesia, all companies whose shares are
majority owned by the government are mandated by legislation and
the minister of state‐owned enterprise's regulations to engage in
CSR activities. Because a company is owned by the state, the com-
pany may not need to report the activity of GHG emission reductions
to key stakeholders such as the government, because SoEs areprotected by the state (Chu et al., 2012). In other words, environmen-
tal responsibility activities, such as GHG emission reduction, are aimed
not at legitimacy and reducing pressure from the government but as a
form of compliance with government regulation.7 | CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This study examined the determinants of GHG emission disclosure of
Indonesian publicly listed companies. The findings provide evidence
that the company characteristics of profitability, leverage, size, and
industry type are factors that determine companies' disclosures of
GHG emissions. However, this study failed to provide empirical evi-
dence that government ownership has a positive effect on enhancing
public companies to disclose GHG emissions.
Thus, the results of this research are consistent with previous
studies that demonstrated that disclosure of GHG emissions is a
company's way of responding to stakeholder pressure and public visi-
bility while providing legitimacy for their existence. This result implies
that the application of stakeholder, legitimacy, and institutional theo-
ries can provide more insight into disclosure than the motivation of
public Indonesian companies based solely on the consideration of
costs and benefits, that is, the increased legitimacy and reduced pres-
sures, of the activity disclosed.
This study has limitations. Although the implementation of GHG
emission reduction has been mandated by the Indonesian govern-
ment, this study only found about 10% of publicly listed Indonesian
companies consistently disclosed information of GHG emissions
during the research period (2011–2014). This is a challenge for the
Indonesian government to continue pushing companies to provide
GHG emission information in their annual reports. The use of a larger
sample in future studies would provide more details of this finding. In
addition, this study cannot determine the influence of government
regulation on the level of GHG emission disclosure. Although the aver-
age disclosure levels were high, future studies need to assess the qual-
ity of the disclosure: whether it is merely symbolic or substantive.
Overall, these results support the conclusion of Cormier et al.
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